

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, October 30, 2010 5:31 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Threat Updates
Subject: Schedule of SVTC/Teleconferences

Dan,

Do you all have a list of times for any SVTC's/VTC's/Teleconferences that are taking place? If so can you send a copy to us and Threat Updates by replying all to this message with the schedule?

V/r,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
IWW
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 10:08 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: SECOND REMINDER - NOC RFI 1230-10-010 Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - United States

A second reminder in addition to the one sent at 0608 hours this morning.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Assistant Senior Watch Officer
 DHS, National Operations Center

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 6:08 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Reminder For - NOC RFI 1230-10-010 Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - United States

Incident Name: Air Cargo Threat – United States

Date: 31 October 2010

NOC RFI #: 1230-10-010
 1 November 2010/1200 EDT

Requested Due Date/Time:

Current Classification/Caveat Level: UNCLASS

Desired (Highest) Classification/Caveat Level of Response: UNCLASS FOUO LES
SSI

Subject: Summary of Operational Activities by DHS components

Provide the following:

The NOC request a summary of operational activities that DHS components have taken in response to this incident in an effort to account for all potential packages destined for the USA from Yemen since 15 Oct 10 and prevent future packages from coming into the USA from Yemen.

Intended audience: one document outlining all of DHS activities for DHS and Fusion Centers.

Please send responses to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Note: Please ensure that the "SUBJECT LINE" of your response e-mail contains the "Response to NOC RFI #1230-10-010 Summary of Operational Activities"

You may contact the NOC at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), if you have problems sending your reply.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
 DHS National Operations Center

00203

Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, October 30, 2010 5:40 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Threat Updates; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Schedule of SVTC/Teleconferences

I am not aware of any scheduled SVTCs/VTCs/. There was a question about a 1045 SVTCs on Saturday, but no one seems to know about it.

There is one S-1 Telecon (Invitation Only) today at 1700.

I do know OPS leadership has the SVTCs/Telecomm personnel on standby in case of a pop-up requirements comes up over the weekend.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, October 30, 2010 5:31 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Threat Updates
Subject: Schedule of SVTC/Teleconferences

Dan,

Do you all have a list of times for any SVTC's/VTC's/Teleconferences that are taking place? If so can you send a copy to us and Threat Updates by replying all to this message with the schedule?

V/r,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

IWW

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 1:56 AM
To: NOC-DHS-SignificantIncident-Closehold
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

NOC received a update report from TSOC:

- Transportation Security Administration Representative (TSAR) UK stated British EOD has reports of another package possibly going to France. (Unofficial report)
- FEDEX Package was sent from Yemen American Center for Training and Development.
- UPS Package came from the Yemen Computer Institute.
- Actual package in Dubai is in screening facility, never got onto FEDEX aircraft.
 - Came to screening facility via another non-cargo carrier aircraft.
- 12 other packages from Yemen located in Dubai isolated with no screening anomalies. They have been turned over to Fire department per FEDEX corporate security.
- No more packages will be processed for 48 hours in Sana, Yemen.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 7:49 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY
Attachments: image001.jpg
Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Bryan,

NOC CBP Desk has queried CBP OPS Center. NOC will forward answer upon receipt.

VR,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
 National Operations Center
 Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 7:43 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

Anyone know what the red flag initiative is?

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 6:31 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

OK that's alright... What is the "red flag" initiative

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 6:29 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

Brian

That will probably take some time to answer. Doubt we'll have that by 0730.

Regards,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Duty Director

National Operations Center

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Unclas: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 6:27 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

This pretty much satisfies my request, but I'm sure the Secretary will ask why a redelivery of a parcel destined for Cincinnati sat at JFK for some time. Any insight into that?

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 6:24 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

From the CBP Commissioner's Morning Report:

SYNOPSIS: On November 3, CBP JFK International Airport, NY reported the interception of a package originating from Yemen. The package was targeted under the "Yemen Red Flag Initiative" and was returned to DHL at JFK. The package ex-ray examination revealed an anomaly. NYPD Bomb Squad, PAPD, JTTF and ICE were notified and responded. The package, which was found to contain a cell phone, was inspected with negative results.

Believe this with the SWO's response below should answer your questions.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Duty Director

National Operations Center

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Unclas: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 5:56 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Partial Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

Questions have been tasked to TSA and CBP. In the interim, attached is the TSA report with a photo:

Q 2: According to the attached report, the package arrived on 10/29 onboard Emirates 203 (Dubai, UAE – NY Kennedy).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

DHS National Operations Center - Watch

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 5:20 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

Importance: High

The Secretary's Briefing Staff's RFI follows. CBP/TSA – please provide any information you have to answer the RFI. Please note suspense time.

Good Morning, In advance of the Secretary's morning briefing today, can you please provide (via CBP or other means) the following information:

- 1. When the package in question involved in the incident below departed Yemen.**
- 2. Where it had come from immediately before arriving at JFK.**
- 3. How the package was identified by authorities and whether/how it was flagged by CBP as suspicious (whether by standard targeting rules or other means)/**

Please provide no later than 7:30am. Thanks.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

DHS National Operations Center - Watch

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 5:15 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc: Triner, Donald; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: S1 RFI

Importance: High

Good Morning, In advance of the Secretary's morning briefing today, can you please provide (via CBP or other means) the following information:

4. When the package in question involved in the incident below departed Yemen.
5. Where it had come from immediately before arriving at JFK.
6. How the package was identified by authorities and whether/how it was flagged by CBP as suspicious (whether by standard targeting rules or other means)/

Please provide no later than 7:30am. Thanks.

Bryan

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Wednesday, November 03, 2010 8:45 PM

Subject: NOC Steady State 1230-10 Update Report 9 - Cargo Facility Evacuated - New York, NY (2030 EDT 3 Nov 10)

NOC Steady State 1230-10 Update Report 9 - Cargo Facility Evacuated – New York, NY

Current: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reports a cargo facility at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) was partially evacuated while a suspicious package was investigated by New York/New Jersey Port Authority police. Customs and Border Protection reported a re-delivery on a package originating from Yemen. A Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) scan revealed a cell phone. No explosives were detected. A Department of Homeland Security component and inter-agency blast call was conducted with amplifying information from TSA. The package was cleared and identified as a cell phone wrapped in envelopes and paper. The cargo facility has resumed normal operations.

Future: The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) will continue to monitor this incident and provide updates as warranted. This item will be removed from the Common Operational Picture at 2130 EDT.

Other: Open source media reports that the package originally arrived on United Arab Emirates flight 201 on 29 Oct.

Background: On the evening of 28 Oct 10, TSA reported suspicious packages aboard two commercial cargo aircraft.



v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Assistant Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 12:31 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - 01 Nov 10

Tom,

Below is the NICC response for 1230-10-010.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Assistant Senior Watch Officer
 DHS, National Operations Center

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 12:30 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - 01 Nov 10

NOC,

The NICC is providing the following response to your request from DHS components and actions taken in response to the Air Cargo threat on 29 Oct 10 in an effort to account for all potential packages destined for the USA from Yemen since 15 Oct 10 and prevent future packages from coming into the USA from Yemen. (e.g., any analysis, documents, and actions taken by your organization in response to the Air Cargo Threat on 29 Oct 10.) *NOTE: The NICC was unable to contact US-VISIT or Risk Management for input to this RFI.*

IP

- Protective Security Advisors conducted outreach with multiple Jewish communities.
- Conducted outreach with Sector Coordinating Council members in the Postal & Shipping sector to determine and fulfill information requirements.
- Coordinated with offices within DHS intelligence and risk identification community to ensure coordination across DHS HQ elements producing awareness products and briefings.
- Developed and disseminated multiple Situational Awareness, Spot, and Current Situation Reports
- Provided multiple inputs for NOC Phase 1 reporting
- Posted multiple documents to HSIN-CS for Critical Infrastructure Stakeholders, including:
 - Infrastructure Protection Report Series: Mail and Package Handling Facilities
 - U.S. Postal Inspection Service Guide to Mail Center Security
 - Best Practices for Safe Mail Handling (Interagency Security Committee)
 - Mail and Package Handling Facilities: Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity, Common Vulnerabilities and Protective Measures
 - Religious Facilities: Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity, Common Vulnerabilities and Protective Measures
 - Infrastructure Protection Report Series: Religious Facilities
 - All NICC Current Situation Reports - Suspicious Packages on Inbound Cargo Flights
 - Potential for Exploitation of Postal and Commercial Shipping Companies, 31 Oct 10

- Explosives Discovered in Packages on Cargo Aircraft Bound for the Homeland - Snapshot - 31 Oct 10

NCC/NCS: No inputs at this time

US CERT: No inputs at this time

FPS: No action anticipated

If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the NICC at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

V/r,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

NICC Watch Operations

Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

For more information on the NICC go to:

[DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center](#)

Distro

NICC Support

NICC SWO

NOC SWO Restricted

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 2:47 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Chavez, Richard; DiFalco, Frank; Triner, Donald; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Disguised International Explosive Shipment

NOC received a update report from TSA:

- Transportation Security Administration Representative (TSAR) UK stated British EOD has reports of another package possibly going to France. (Unofficial report)
- FEDEX Package was sent from Yemen American Center for Training and Development.
- UPS Package came from the Yemen Computer Institute.
- Actual package in Dubai is in screening facility, never got onto FEDEX aircraft.
 - Came to screening facility via another non-cargo carrier aircraft.
- 12 other packages from Yemen located in Dubai isolated with no screening anomalies. They have been turned over to Fire department per FEDEX corporate security.
- No more packages will be processed for 48 hours in Sana, Yemen.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Duty Director

National Operations Center

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Unclas (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, October 30, 2010 5:42 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Threat Updates
Subject: RE: Schedule of SVTC/Teleconferences

Thank you for that information Dan.

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, October 30, 2010 5:40 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Threat Updates; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Schedule of SVTC/Teleconferences

I am not aware of any scheduled SVTCs/VTCs/. There was a question about a 1045 SVTCs on Saturday, but no one seems to know about it.

There is one S-1 Telecon (Invitation Only) today at 1700.

I do know OPS leadership has the SVTCs/Telecomm personnel on standby in case of a pop-up requirements comes up over the weekend.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
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To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
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Subject: Schedule of SVTC/Teleconferences

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
IWW
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 12:32 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - 01 Nov 10

NOC,

The NICC is providing the following response to your request from DHS components and actions taken in response to the Air Cargo threat on 29 Oct 10 in an effort to account for all potential packages destined for the USA from Yemen since 15 Oct 10 and prevent future packages from coming into the USA from Yemen. (e.g., any analysis, documents, and actions taken by your organization in response to the Air Cargo Threat on 29 Oct 10.) *NOTE: The NICC was unable to contact US-VISIT or Risk Management for input to this RFI.*

IP

- Protective Security Advisors conducted outreach with multiple Jewish communities.
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 - Explosives Discovered in Packages on Cargo Aircraft Bound for the Homeland - Snapshot - 31 Oct 10

NCC/NCS: No inputs at this time

US CERT: No inputs at this time

FPS: No action anticipated

If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the NICC at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

V/r,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
NICC Watch Operations
Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

For more information on the NICC go to:
[DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center](#)

Distro
NICC Support
NICC SWO
NOC SWO Restricted

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 8:20 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: NOC 1230-10-012, Red Flag Initiative

CBP,

This is a follow-up to an earlier tasking from the SWO.

The Secretary's Briefing Staff requires the definition of "Red Flag Initiative" for an upcoming brief to S1.

Please provide as soon as possible.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Assistant Senior Watch Officer
DHS, National Operations Center
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 2:54 AM
To: FBI CT Watch
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

Mr. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),

CINT pointed out that this proposed TEARLINE was sent shortly after the 0100 SVTC started so still contains some information that the IC did not want mentioned in the TEARLINE. Please refer to the 0100 SVTC discussion for guidance.

V/r,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 2:23 AM
To: IA.IWW
Subject: FW: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN
Importance: High

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – see below proposed tearline verbiage./Jack

From: CTWatch (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 1:04 AM
To: FBI CT Watch; Robert S. Mueller; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

UPDATE

As per SC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the following Tearline was requested to be disseminated regarding captioned event:

-----TEARLINE-----

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

WARNING: THIS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION REPORT CONCERNING A POTENTIAL THREAT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. IT IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO U.S. RECIPIENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING OR RESPONDING TO THREATS. THIS INFORMATION MAY NOT BE PROVIDED TO THE PRESS OR THE PUBLIC WITHOUT FURTHER AUTHORIZATION.

Subject: ALLEGED AQAP SHIPMENT TO CHICAGO, IL OF TWO PRINTERS VIA COMMERCIAL SHIPPING COMPANIES BELIEVED TO CONTAIN EXPLOSIVES IN THE TONER CARTRIDGES

In late October 2010, two packages containing printers sent via commercial shipping companies UPS and FEDEX from Sana, Yemen to Chicago, Illinois, United States, were believed to have explosives in the printers' toner cartridges. (COMMENT: The explosives may be in liquid form.) Of note, the smaller of the packages shipped via UPS was believed

to contain a timer, and the larger shipped via FEDEX a cellular telephone. As of 29 October 2010, the packages may have been located in Europe with an expected arrival date in Chicago of 1 November 2010.

3. As of 29 October 2010, the following details were known regarding the two packages:

A. UPS Package:

SENT FROM: The Yemen American institute (for) Languages-Computer-Management

(Y.A.I.)

SENDER INFORMATION (COMMENT: Several characters are missing at the beginning of each line of the shipper's way bill.)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

CONTENTS: Printer, books

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

-----TEARLINE-----

From: CTWatch

Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 12:28 AM

To: CTWatch; Robert S. Mueller; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

UPDATE

Both packages (UPS and FedEx) have been located and are still currently being screened.

CT Watch

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: CTWatch

Sent: Thursday, October 28, 2010 11:22 PM

To: CTWatch; Robert S. Mueller; CTW_TIER1; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

UPDATE

Originating information is from a highly credible source.

FedEx has coordinated with Dubai Authorities re getting item off of FedEx aircraft and isolating item that contains TR (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E) until Dubai can neutralize item.

As per SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) : UPS has located their package in Great Britain and putting in isolation. Authorities on scene.

Additional Flight information: UPS flight from Yemen to Cologne to Great Britain to Chicago.

CT Watch is currently engaged in efforts to obtain additional information regarding this matter. We will continue to post updates, when appropriate, in an expeditious manner.

CT Watch/rcs

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: CTWatch

Sent: Thursday, October 28, 2010 10:17 PM

To: Robert S. Mueller; CTW_TIER1; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

ALCON:

Information received from a source which is assessed to be credible stated that there are explosives contained in toner cartridges which are to be detonated while in the air.

Reports are that the packages were sent from Yemen with a final destination of Chicago.

The following shipping numbers were provided:

UPS: (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

Fed Ex: (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

CT Watch has requested the relevant Divisions coordinate with the companies.

CT Watch is currently engaged in efforts to obtain additional information regarding this matter. We will continue to post updates, when appropriate, in an expeditious manner.

CT Watch/rcs

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) <CTR> on behalf of NOC.CWO
Sent: Saturday, October 30, 2010 6:16 PM
To: Kroloff, Noah; Sibley, Matthew; Shlossman, Amy; de Vallance, Brian; LOPEZ, MARCO A (HQ); Pistole, John; Macias, Art Chief of Staff; Cohen, John <CTR>; Cohen, John <CTR>; Beers, Rand; Heyman, David; Sandweg, John; Smith, Sean; JHL; Wagner, Caryn; BUCELLA, DONNA A.; Peacock, Nelson; Ramanathan, Sue; Bernstein, Jarrod; Marino, Charles; Hill, Alice; Johnson, Bart R; Barr, Suzanne E; Morton, John; BUSH, THOMAS L; Rossides, Gale; Dinkins, James A; Smith, Douglas A; Fong, Ivan
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: S1 4:00pm (1600 EDT) Conference Call Information

DHS Senior Leadership,

The Secretary will be hosting a call at **4:00 pm** (1600 EDT) on **Sunday, October 31, 2010**. Please dial into the conference at least five (5) minutes prior to the start of the call.

Please dial 202- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

The **first voice prompt** states, "Welcome to the DHS unclassified conference bridge, please enter your conference PIN followed by the pound sign." The PIN is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) followed by the (#) sign.

A reminder e-mail will be sent at 3:30 pm (1530 EDT).

If you need more assistance on how to enter the conference, please contact the NOC Communications Watch Officer (CWO) at (202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

V/r,

Communications Watch Officer
 National Operations Center
 US Department of Homeland Security
 Office: (202) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

1. Threat coordination conference calls with TSA and FBI
 - TSA Intel
 - 10302010: *In process of coordinating and confirming with TSOC on the status of shipments that are on ground stoppage (foreign)*
 - 103102010: *CBP has received status update on 5 of the 9 shipments that are on ground stoppage (foreign). The five are being held in Dubai. Pending confirmation of the remaining four from TSOC.*
 - FBI NJTTF
 - *Extracted a data pull (based on JTTF requirements) and provided results*
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 - 10302010: *At this time, FBI does not plan further action on any shipments to the U.S. from Yemen.*
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 - *Rule(s) created to identify shipments destined to identified synagogues in the Chicago metropolitan area*
 - *All Express Consignment inbound shipments with a country of Yemen on are on hold*
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 - 10312010: *CBP has identified risk factors related to air cargo and implemented threat specific targeting criteria*
3. Research any cargo shipment that may be en route from YE – OIOC/OFO - *Completed*
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 - 10302010: *The six (6) shipments that were identified as en route to the United States (port of arrival – JFK) were physically inspected with negative results and are being held*
4. Existing Cargo Targeting Rules that could cover this threat – OIOC/OFO - *Completed*
 - *Any new rules that could be added based on this threat – new rule being drafted now by OIOC – Completed*
 - *New weightset created that will effect an auto hold on all shipments from Yemen*
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5. Cargo data pull on any shipment from YE or SA to Chicago or LA from 10/15 thru 10/29 – *OIOC completed and results shared with JTTF*

- *10302010: OIOC has coordinated with TASPO to run these same shipments against all the newly created Yemen-related rules/Weight sets/lookouts deployed yesterday*
 - *10312010: 594 of the 6K+ shipments were from Yemen. Preliminary scrub of the shipments does not reveal any glaring anomalies. There are two data elements that CBP will research for an email hit only notification with possible rule development.*
 - *10312010: NTCC and OIOC will conduct in depth research and analysis on the shipments to glean additional criteria for potential rule development*
6. Notification to Field elements
 - Unclassified threat data to DFOs – *OIOC completed*
 - Unclassified threat data to IAP/CSI – *OFO completed*
 7. Full OFO read-out on inspections occurring on the ground in PHI and EWR – OFO – *Pending physical examination results of the identified shipments*
 - *10302010: Physical examination conducted with negative results*
 8. Outbound Passenger – OFO/OIOC – *In Process*
 - *Implemented scenario-based passenger threshold targeting rule to identify last minute bookings destined for Yemen*
 - *103102010: Final impact assessment for remaining three rules completed and the rules have been implemented*
 - *OFO issued guidance to the field requesting all airports to immediately increase outbound efforts, with a focus on individuals traveling to Yemen. Ports within each Field Office area of responsibility was to make use of all available resources to include, but not limited to, review of outbound PNR information for travel to Yemen, use of targeting units, and outbound enforcement teams. Ports were directed to contact the NTC-P and JTTF as appropriate in accordance with existing policy.*
 9. Border Patrol: We are making our employees aware of the threat and increasing vigilance.
 10. OAM responds with no comment.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 8:21 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: NOC 1230-10-012, Red Flag Initiative

Understood, just made a call and they expect an answer very soon.

NOC CBP DESK

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 8:20 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: NOC 1230-10-012, Red Flag Initiative

CBP,

This is a follow-up to an earlier tasking from the SWO.

The Secretary's Briefing Staff requires the definition of "Red Flag Initiative" for an upcoming brief to S1.

Please provide as soon as possible.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Assistant Senior Watch Officer
DHS, National Operations Center
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: CTWatch **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 3:13 AM
To: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**
Cc: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**
Subject: RE: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

Per the request of the NSC, the previously referenced TEARLINE is not authorized for further dissemination. A revised TEARLINE will be forthcoming later this morning.

CT Watch

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: CTWatch
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 1:04 AM
To: CTWatch; Robert S. Mueller; CTW_TIER1; **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**

Subject: RE: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

UPDATE

As per SC **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)** the following Tearline was requested to be disseminated regarding captioned event:

-----TEARLINE-----

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

WARNING: THIS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION REPORT CONCERNING A POTENTIAL THREAT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. IT IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO U.S. RECIPIENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING OR RESPONDING TO THREATS. THIS INFORMATION MAY NOT BE PROVIDED TO THE PRESS OR THE PUBLIC WITHOUT FURTHER AUTHORIZATION.

Subject: ALLEGED AQAP SHIPMENT TO CHICAGO, IL OF TWO PRINTERS VIA COMMERCIAL SHIPPING COMPANIES BELIEVED TO CONTAIN EXPLOSIVES IN THE TONER CARTRIDGES

In late October 2010, two packages containing printers sent via commercial shipping companies UPS and FEDEX from Sana, Yemen to Chicago, Illinois, United States, were believed to have explosives in the printers' toner cartridges. (COMMENT: The explosives may be in liquid form.) Of note, the smaller of the packages shipped via UPS was believed to contain a timer, and the larger shipped via FEDEX a cellular telephone. As of 29 October 2010, the packages may have been located in Europe with an expected arrival date in Chicago of 1 November 2010.

3. As of 29 October 2010, the following details were known regarding the two packages:

A. UPS Package:

SENT FROM: The Yemen American institute (for) Languages-Computer-Management

(Y.A.I.)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

B. FEDEX Package:

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

CONTENTS: Printer, books

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

-----TEARLINE-----

From: CTWatch

Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 12:28 AM

To: CTWatch; Robert S. Mueller; CTW_TIER1; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

UPDATE

Both packages (UPS and FedEx) have been located and are still currently being screened.

CT Watch

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: CTWatch

Sent: Thursday, October 28, 2010 11:22 PM

To: CTWatch; Robert S. Mueller; CTW_TIER1; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

UPDATE

Originating information is from a highly credible source.

FedEx has coordinated with Dubai Authorities re getting item off of FedEx aircraft and isolating item that contains (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E) until Dubai can neutralize item.

As per SSA Keith Carpenter: UPS has located their package in Great Britain and putting in isolation. Authorities on scene.

Additional Flight information: UPS flight from Yemen to Cologne to Great Britain to Chicago.

CT Watch is currently engaged in efforts to obtain additional information regarding this matter. We will continue to post updates, when appropriate, in an expeditious manner.

CT Watch/rcs

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: CTWatch

Sent: Thursday, October 28, 2010 10:17 PM

To: Robert S. Mueller; CTW_TIER1; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

ALCON:

Information received from a source which is assessed to be credible stated that there are explosives contained in toner cartridges which are to be detonated while in the air.

Reports are that the packages were sent from Yemen with a final destination of Chicago.

The following shipping numbers were provided:

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

CT Watch has requested the relevant Divisions coordinate with the companies.

CT Watch is currently engaged in efforts to obtain additional information regarding this matter. We will continue to post updates, when appropriate, in an expeditious manner.

CT Watch/rcs

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Saturday, October 30, 2010 6:42 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: UPDATE: NOC/CAT Battle Rhythm Sunday, 31 Oct

IWW,

Note the 1100 SVTC for tomorrow, in case you haven't seen.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
Non-Secure: 202-(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Secure: 202-(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: Triner, Donald; Chavez, Richard; Fagerholm, Eric; Castro, Raul; Kruger, Mary; Burke, Richard
Cc: DiFalco, Frank; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sat Oct 30 17:55:47 2010
Subject: UPDATE: NOC/CAT Battle Rhythm Sunday, 31 Oct

To All:

1700 S1 call complete. She scheduled a 1600 EDT tomorrow. Waiting for final direction from Mr. Kroloff before sending the announcements.

So far for Sunday, 31 Oct:
0600 NOC Phase 1 Update Report
0930 S1/S2 OPS/intel PDB brief
1100 DC SVTC in NOC IWW Conf Rm
1600 S1 conference call
1800 NOC Phase 1 Update Report

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
National Operations Center
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Unclassified: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: Triner, Donald
Sent: Saturday, October 30, 2010 11:48 AM
To: Chavez, Richard; Fagerholm, Eric; Castro, Raul; Kruger, Mary; Burke, Richard
Cc: DiFalco, Frank; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: NOC/CAT Support Cell stand down

I have released all additional OPS personnel for the Cargo Threat Response – NOC remains at Phase 1 and will through the weekend. We will assess at the Monday 0730.

Only remaining event for OPS today is the 1700 S1 conference call.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is the SWO and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is the lead CWO.

Thanks to...

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

for the support today.

We were ready.

Saturday....

0600 NOC Phase 1 update report

0930 S1/S2 OPS/intel PDB brief

1000 S1 meeting in bldg 5

1045 Rand Beers SVTC in NOC

1200 DC SVTC in Bldg 19

1200 OPS Senior Leader brief (internal distro)

1700 S1 conference call

1800 NOC Phase 1 update report

Don Triner

Acting Director, Operations Coordination Division

Department of Homeland Security

Office of Operations Coordination and Planning

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED])

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE~~

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 9. Border Patrol: We are making our employees aware of the threat and increasing vigilance.
 10. OAM responds with no comment.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 3:27 AM
To: NOC-DHS-SignificantIncident-Closehold
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 2

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

NOC received an update report from TSOC:

- At 0220 EDT, the Dubai FedEx package was cleared by UAE EOD through K-9 and physical search.
 - The contents of the container included an HP Printer, various clothing articles, paper and CD's.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)d
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 9:41 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: NOC 1230-10-012, Red Flag Initiative

CBP,

Any luck in getting an answer to the below tasking?

This is in response to a direct question from the Secretary's Briefing Staff in preparation for a brief to S1.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Assistant Senior Watch Officer
DHS, National Operations Center

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 8:21 AM
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Subject: RE: NOC 1230-10-012, Red Flag Initiative

Understood, just made a call and they expect an answer very soon.

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This is a follow-up to an earlier tasking from the SWO.

The Secretary's Briefing Staff requires the definition of "Red Flag Initiative" for an upcoming brief to S1.

Please provide as soon as possible.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Assistant Senior Watch Officer
DHS, National Operations Center

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 12:54 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operationa Activities - Air Cargo Threat - United States
Attachments: CBP_Actions_asof_31Oct2010_1500_ NOC RFI (4).doc

Tom,

CBP response for NOC 1230-10-010.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Assistant Senior Watch Officer
DHS, National Operations Center
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 12:51 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operationa Activities - Air Cargo Threat - United States

CBP submits the attached in response to this tasker.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Office of the Executive Secretariat
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, October 31, 2010 8:57 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Fw: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operationa Activities - Air Cargo Threat - United States
Importance: High

CBPTasking,

Good evening. Please see below from the NOC. Given that this would involve multiple CBP offices, would you like to circulate?

Please advise.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Strategic Planning & Policy
Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**To:** OIOC TASKERS**Cc:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Sent:** Sun Oct 31 19:16:01 2010**Subject:** NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - United States**To:** OIOC Taskings**Re:** NOC RFI #1230-10-010

Please see RFI below from the DHS NOC requesting a summary of operational activities that DHS components have taken in response to the recent air cargo threat from Yemen.

The suspense date is **Nov 1 at 12 noon**.

*Senior Watch Officer**CBP Commissioner's Situation Room*

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Sent:** Sunday, October 31, 2010 7:09 PM**To:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Cc:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Richard; Triner, Donald; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Chavez,

Subject: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - United States**Incident Name:** Air Cargo Threat – United States**Date:** 31 October 2010**NOC RFI #:** 1230-10-010**Requested Due Date/Time:**

1 November 2010/1200 EDT

Current Classification/Caveat Level: UNCLASS**Desired (Highest) Classification/Caveat Level of Response:** UNCLASS FOUO LES
SSI**Subject:** Summary of Operational Activities by DHS components**Provide the following:**

The NOC request a summary of operational activities that DHS components have taken in response to this incident in an effort to account for all potential packages destined for the USA from Yemen since 15 Oct 10 and prevent future packages from coming into the USA from Yemen.

Intended audience: one document outlining all of DHS activities for DHS and Fusion Centers.

Please send responses to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Note: Please ensure that the "SUBJECT LINE" of your response e-mail contains the "**Response to NOC RFI #1230-10-010 Summary of Operational Activities**"

You may contact the NOC at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), if you have problems sending your reply.

Thank you,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

DHS National Operations Center

Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 9:43 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: NOC 1230-10-012, Red Flag Initiative

See below inquiry.

NOC CBP DESK

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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Any luck in getting an answer to the below tasking?

This is in response to a direct question from the Secretary's Briefing Staff in preparation for a brief to S1.

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Assistant Senior Watch Officer
DHS, National Operations Center

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
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Understood, just made a call and they expect an answer very soon.

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Subject: NOC 1230-10-012, Red Flag Initiative

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This is a follow-up to an earlier tasking from the SWO.

The Secretary's Briefing Staff requires the definition of "Red Flag Initiative" for an upcoming brief to S1.

Please provide as soon as possible.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Assistant Senior Watch Officer
DHS, National Operations Center

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 3:30 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Chavez, Richard; DiFalco, Frank; Triner, Donald; Gramlick, Carl; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 2

NOC received an update report from TSA:

- At 0220 EDT, the Dubai FedEx package was cleared by UAE EOD through K-9 and physical search.
 - The contents of the container included an HP Printer, various clothing articles, paper and CD's.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Duty Director

National Operations Center

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Unclas: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 12:56 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - 01 Nov 10 (Update)

Tom,

NICC response for 1230-10-010 with an addition in RED.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
 Assistant Senior Watch Officer
 DHS, National Operations Center
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 12:53 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - 01 Nov 10 (Update)

NOC,

Please include the response below in **red**:

The NICC is providing the following response to your request from DHS components and actions taken in response to the Air Cargo threat on 29 Oct 10 in an effort to account for all potential packages destined for the USA from Yemen since 15 Oct 10 and prevent future packages from coming into the USA from Yemen. (e.g., any analysis, documents, and actions taken by your organization in response to the Air Cargo Threat on 29 Oct 10.) *NOTE: The NICC was unable to contact US-VISIT or Risk Management for input to this RFI.*

IP

- Protective Security Advisors conducted outreach with multiple Jewish communities.
- Conducted outreach with Sector Coordinating Council members in the Postal & Shipping sector to determine and fulfill information requirements.
- Coordinated with offices within DHS intelligence and risk identification community to ensure coordination across DHS HQ elements producing awareness products and briefings.
- Developed and disseminated multiple Situational Awareness, Spot, and Current Situation Reports
- Provided multiple inputs for NOC Phase 1 reporting
- Posted multiple documents to HSIN-CS for Critical Infrastructure Stakeholders, including:
 - Infrastructure Protection Report Series: Mail and Package Handling Facilities
 - U.S. Postal Inspection Service Guide to Mail Center Security
 - Best Practices for Safe Mail Handling (Interagency Security Committee)
 - Mail and Package Handling Facilities: Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity, Common Vulnerabilities and Protective Measures

00243

- Religious Facilities: Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity, Common Vulnerabilities and Protective Measures
- Infrastructure Protection Report Series: Religious Facilities
- All NICC Current Situation Reports - Suspicious Packages on Inbound Cargo Flights
- Potential for Exploitation of Postal and Commercial Shipping Companies, 31 Oct 10
- Explosives Discovered in Packages on Cargo Aircraft Bound for the Homeland - Snapshot - 31 Oct 10

NCC/NCS: No inputs at this time

US CERT: No inputs at this time

FPS: No action anticipated

RMA: No inputs at this time

V/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

NICC Watch Operations

Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

For more information on the NICC go to:
[DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center](#)

Distro
NICC Support
NICC SWO
NOC SWO Restricted

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 10:16 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY
Attachments: image001.jpg

Please see the below response

NOC CBP DESK

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 10:13 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

Please see the below response

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
 Senior Watch Officer
 Commissioner's Situation Room
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 10:12 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

In response to recent aviation security threats associated with Yemen; all express consignment and air cargo shipments from Yemen that are on the ground, en route to, or transiting the U.S. were targeted for examination by CBP. All inbound and outbound maritime cargo and air cargo from or destined to Yemen have been targeted for examination. All shipments have been or will be examined to include physical inspection and NII and explosive detection equipment where available.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
 (A) Deputy Executive Director
 Office of Field Operations
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
 cell

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 10:00 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

OFO Liaisons,

Please see the email string below requesting information on the latest package from Yemen. The original questions (at the bottom of the email) have been answered, but the Secretary's Briefing Team sent back the following question:

CBP: Do you have a short paragraph on what the "Yemen Red Flag Initiative" is for the Secretary's Briefing Staff?

Since this is an OFO initiative can you provide a response?

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Watch Officer
Commissioner's Situation Room
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 7:13 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

Please see below.

NOC CBP DESK
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 6:37 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

CBP: Do you have a short paragraph on what the "Yemen Red Flag Initiative" is for the Secretary's Briefing Staff?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center - Watch
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 6:27 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)d

Subject: RE: Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

This pretty much satisfies my request, but I'm sure the Secretary will ask why a redelivery of a parcel destined for Cincinnati sat at JFK for some time. Any insight into that?

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 6:24 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

From the CBP Commissioner's Morning Report:

SYNOPSIS: On November 3, CBP JFK International Airport, NY reported the interception of a package originating from Yemen. The package was targeted under the "Yemen Red Flag Initiative" and was returned to DHL at JFK. The package ex-ray examination revealed an anomaly. NYPD Bomb Squad, PAPD, JTTF and ICE were notified and responded. The package, which was found to contain a cell phone, was inspected with negative results.

Believe this with the SWO's response below should answer your questions.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Duty Director

National Operations Center

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Unclas: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 5:56 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Partial Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

Questions have been tasked to TSA and CBP. In the interim, attached is the TSA report with a photo:

Q 2: According to the attached report, the package arrived on 10/29 onboard Emirates 203 (Dubai, UAE – NY Kennedy).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

DHS National Operations Center - Watch

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 5:20 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY
Importance: High

The Secretary's Briefing Staff's RFI follows. CBP/TSA – please provide any information you have to answer the RFI. Please note suspense time.

Good Morning, In advance of the Secretary's morning briefing today, can you please provide (via CBP or other means) the following information:

- 1. When the package in question involved in the incident below departed Yemen.**
- 2. Where it had come from immediately before arriving at JFK.**
- 3. How the package was identified by authorities and whether/how it was flagged by CBP as suspicious (whether by standard targeting rules or other means)/**

Please provide no later than 7:30am. Thanks.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

DHS National Operations Center - Watch

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 5:15 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc: Triner, Donald; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: S1 RFI

Importance: High

Good Morning, In advance of the Secretary's morning briefing today, can you please provide (via CBP or other means) the following information:

4. When the package in question involved in the incident below departed Yemen.
5. Where it had come from immediately before arriving at JFK.
6. How the package was identified by authorities and whether/how it was flagged by CBP as suspicious (whether by standard targeting rules or other means)/

Please provide no later than 7:30am. Thanks.

Bryan

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Wednesday, November 03, 2010 8:45 PM

Subject: NOC Steady State 1230-10 Update Report 9 - Cargo Facility Evacuated - New York, NY (2030 EDT 3 Nov 10)

NOC Steady State 1230-10 Update Report 9 - Cargo Facility Evacuated – New York, NY

Current: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reports a cargo facility at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) was partially evacuated while a suspicious package was investigated by New York/New Jersey Port Authority police. Customs and Border Protection reported

a re-delivery on a package originating from Yemen. A Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) scan revealed a cell phone. No explosives were detected. A Department of Homeland Security component and inter-agency blast call was conducted with amplifying information from TSA. The package was cleared and identified as a cell phone wrapped in envelopes and paper. The cargo facility has resumed normal operations.

Future: The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) will continue to monitor this incident and provide updates as warranted. This item will be removed from the Common Operational Picture at 2130 EDT.

Other: Open source media reports that the package originally arrived on United Arab Emirates flight 201 on 29 Oct.

Background: On the evening of 28 Oct 10, TSA reported suspicious packages aboard two commercial cargo aircraft.



v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Assistant Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 3:35 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) FBI; NCTC
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment

For your awareness,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 3:27 AM
To: NOC
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

NOC received an update report from TSOC:

- At 0220 EDT, the Dubai FedEx package was cleared by UAE EOD through K-9 and physical search.
 - The contents of the container included an HP Printer, various clothing articles, paper and CD's.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 2:16 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - 01 Nov 10 (Update #1)

NOC,

Please include the response below in **red**:

The NICC is providing the following response to your request from DHS components and actions taken in response to the Air Cargo threat on 29 Oct 10 in an effort to account for all potential packages destined for the USA from Yemen since 15 Oct 10 and prevent future packages from coming into the USA from Yemen. (e.g., any analysis, documents, and actions taken by your organization in response to the Air Cargo Threat on 29 Oct 10.) *NOTE: The NICC was unable to contact US-VISIT or Risk Management for input to this RFI.*

IP

- Protective Security Advisors conducted outreach with multiple Jewish communities.
- Conducted outreach with Sector Coordinating Council members in the Postal & Shipping sector to determine and fulfill information requirements.
- Coordinated with offices within DHS intelligence and risk identification community to ensure coordination across DHS HQ elements producing awareness products and briefings.
- Developed and disseminated multiple Situational Awareness, Spot, and Current Situation Reports
- Provided multiple inputs for NOC Phase 1 reporting
- Posted multiple documents to HSIN-CS for Critical Infrastructure Stakeholders, including:
 - Infrastructure Protection Report Series: Mail and Package Handling Facilities
 - U.S. Postal Inspection Service Guide to Mail Center Security
 - Best Practices for Safe Mail Handling (Interagency Security Committee)
 - Mail and Package Handling Facilities: Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity, Common Vulnerabilities and Protective Measures
 - Religious Facilities: Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity, Common Vulnerabilities and Protective Measures
 - Infrastructure Protection Report Series: Religious Facilities
 - All NICC Current Situation Reports - Suspicious Packages on Inbound Cargo Flights
 - Potential for Exploitation of Postal and Commercial Shipping Companies, 31 Oct 10
 - Explosives Discovered in Packages on Cargo Aircraft Bound for the Homeland - Snapshot - 31 Oct 10

Cont'

- Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) published a Quick Look Report (QLR) on TRIPwire for bomb squads and other members of law enforcement
- OBP is also coordinating with the FBI's Terrorist Explosives Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) to understand the nature and construction of the explosive devices found in England and Dubai. Once additional information on the devices is cleared for release, OBP will distribute on TRIPwire
- IP is conducting outreach this week to select Jewish facilities and synagogues in Chicago

- Wednesday 03 November IP in cooperation with I&A, the FBI, local law enforcement, the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago and the Secure Communities Network (SCN) will be holding a FOUO conference call with major Jewish facilities and synagogues nationwide to provide recommended protective measures

NCC/NCS: No inputs at this time

US CERT: No inputs at this time

FPS: No action anticipated

RMA: No inputs at this time

V/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

NICC Watch Operations

Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

For more information on the NICC go to:
DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 10:21 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY
Attachments: image001.jpg

SBS,

CBP: Do you have a short paragraph on what the "Yemen Red Flag Initiative" is for the Secretary's Briefing Staff?

Answer:

In response to recent aviation security threats associated with Yemen; all express consignment and air cargo shipments from Yemen that are on the ground, en route to, or transiting the U.S. were targeted for examination by CBP. All inbound and outbound maritime cargo and air cargo from or destined to Yemen have been targeted for examination. All shipments have been or will be examined to include physical inspection and NII and explosive detection equipment where available.

VR,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
 National Operations Center
 Department of Homeland Security
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 10:16 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: FW: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

Please see the below response

NOC CBP DESK

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 10:13 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

Please see the below response

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
 Senior Watch Officer
 Commissioner's Situation Room
 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 10:12 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

In response to recent aviation security threats associated with Yemen; all express consignment and air cargo shipments from Yemen that are on the ground, en route to, or transiting the U.S. were targeted for examination by CBP. All inbound and outbound maritime cargo and air cargo from or destined to Yemen have been targeted for examination. All shipments have been or will be examined to include physical inspection and NII and explosive detection equipment where available.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(A) Deputy Executive Director
Office of Field Operations

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 10:00 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: FW: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

OFO Liaisons,

Please see the email string below requesting information on the latest package from Yemen. The original questions (at the bottom of the email) have been answered, but the Secretary's Briefing Team sent back the following question:

CBP: Do you have a short paragraph on what the "Yemen Red Flag Initiative" is for the Secretary's Briefing Staff?

Since this is an OFO initiative can you provide a response?

Thanks,

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
Commissioner's Situation Room

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 7:13 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: FW: Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

Please see below.

NOC CBP DESK

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Sent:** Thursday, November 04, 2010 6:37 AM**To:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Subject:** Additional question: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

CBP: Do you have a short paragraph on what the "Yemen Red Flag Initiative" is for the Secretary's Briefing Staff?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

*Senior Watch Officer**DHS National Operations Center - Watch*

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Sent:** Thursday, November 04, 2010 6:27 AM**To:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Subject:** RE: Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

This pretty much satisfies my request, but I'm sure the Secretary will ask why a redelivery of a parcel destined for Cincinnati sat at JFK for some time. Any insight into that?

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Sent:** Thursday, November 04, 2010 6:24 AM**To:** (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Subject:** Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

From the CBP Commissioner's Morning Report:

SYNOPSIS: On November 3, CBP JFK International Airport, NY reported the interception of a package originating from Yemen. The package was targeted under the "Yemen Red Flag Initiative" and was returned to DHL at JFK. The package ex-ray examination revealed an anomaly. NYPD Bomb Squad, PAPD, JTTF and ICE were notified and responded. The package, which was found to contain a cell phone, was inspected with negative results.

Believe this with the SWO's response below should answer your questions.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Duty Director**National Operations Center**

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Unclas: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 5:56 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: Partial Answer: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY

Questions have been tasked to TSA and CBP. In the interim, attached is the TSA report with a photo:

Q 2: According to the attached report, the package arrived on 10/29 onboard Emirates 203 (Dubai, UAE – NY Kennedy).

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

DHS National Operations Center - Watch

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 5:20 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: NOC # 1230-10- 012 S1 RFI - QUICK RESPONSE REQUESTED: NOC 12301-10/ / Cargo Facility Evacuated - NY
Importance: High

The Secretary's Briefing Staff's RFI follows. CBP/TSA – please provide any information you have to answer the RFI. Please note suspense time.

Good Morning, In advance of the Secretary's morning briefing today, can you please provide (via CBP or other means) the following information:

- 1. When the package in question involved in the incident below departed Yemen.**
- 2. Where it had come from immediately before arriving at JFK.**
- 3. How the package was identified by authorities and whether/how it was flagged by CBP as suspicious (whether by standard targeting rules or other means)/**

Please provide no later than 7:30am. Thanks.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

DHS National Operations Center - Watch

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thursday, November 04, 2010 5:15 AM

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Cc: Triner, Donald; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Subject:** S1 RFI**Importance:** High

Good Morning, In advance of the Secretary's morning briefing today, can you please provide (via CBP or other means) the following information:

4. When the package in question involved in the incident below departed Yemen.
5. Where it had come from immediately before arriving at JFK.
6. How the package was identified by authorities and whether/how it was flagged by CBP as suspicious (whether by standard targeting rules or other means)/

Please provide no later than 7:30am. Thanks.

Bryan

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**Sent:** Wednesday, November 03, 2010 8:45 PM**Subject:** NOC Steady State 1230-10 Update Report 9 - Cargo Facility Evacuated - New York, NY (2030 EDT 3 Nov 10)

NOC Steady State 1230-10 Update Report 9 - Cargo Facility Evacuated – New York, NY

Current: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reports a cargo facility at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) was partially evacuated while a suspicious package was investigated by New York/New Jersey Port Authority police. Customs and Border Protection reported a re-delivery on a package originating from Yemen. A Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) scan revealed a cell phone. No explosives were detected. A Department of Homeland Security component and inter-agency blast call was conducted with amplifying information from TSA. The package was cleared and identified as a cell phone wrapped in envelopes and paper. The cargo facility has resumed normal operations.

Future: The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) will continue to monitor this incident and provide updates as warranted. This item will be removed from the Common Operational Picture at 2130 EDT.

Other: Open source media reports that the package originally arrived on United Arab Emirates flight 201 on 29 Oct.

Background: On the evening of 28 Oct 10, TSA reported suspicious packages aboard two commercial cargo aircraft.



v/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Assistant Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: MTAC Watch Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 3:56 AM
To: MTAC Current Intel; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) D BWC; DHS
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Code 21; CNGL; CNSL
29 OCT 10 / UNITED STATES / ALLEGED AQAP SHIPMENT TO CHICAGO, IL OF TWO
PRINTERS VIA COMMERCIAL SHIPPING COMPANIES BELIEVED TO CONTAIN
EXPLOSIVES IN THE TONER CARTRIDGES

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ALCON,

FFYSA.

NCIS is continuing to monitor this threat and will make the appropriate updates as they become available. Additional reporting can be located at higher classification levels.

WARNING: THIS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION REPORT CONCERNING A POTENTIAL THREAT IS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. IT IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO U.S. RECIPIENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR INVESTIGATING OR RESPONDING TO THREATS. THIS INFORMATION MAY NOT BE PROVIDED TO THE PRESS OR THE PUBLIC WITHOUT FURTHER AUTHORIZATION.

Subject: ALLEGED AQAP SHIPMENT TO CHICAGO, IL OF TWO PRINTERS VIA COMMERCIAL SHIPPING COMPANIES BELIEVED TO CONTAIN EXPLOSIVES IN THE TONER CARTRIDGES

In late October 2010, two packages containing printers sent via commercial shipping companies UPS and FEDEX from Sana, Yemen to Chicago, Illinois, United States, were believed to have explosives in the printers' toner cartridges. (COMMENT: The explosives may be in liquid form.) Of note, the smaller of the packages shipped via UPS was believed to contain a timer, and the larger shipped via FEDEX a cellular telephone. As of 29 October 2010, the packages may have been located in Europe with an expected arrival date in Chicago of 1 November 2010.

3. As of 29 October 2010, the following details were known regarding the two packages:

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

V/r,
LT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
MTAC Watch Officer

Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Multiple Threat Alert Center
Comm: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 4:21 AM
To: NOC-DHS-SignificantIncident-Closehold
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

NOC received an update report from TSOC:

- At 0355 EDT, the UPS package in Midlands, UK has been cleared by Scotland Yard.
 - The contents of the container included a laptop, various clothing articles, and porcelain.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Monday, November 01, 2010 3:39 PM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - 01 Nov 10 (Update #2)

NOC,

Please include the response below in **red**:

The NICC is providing the following response to your request from DHS components and actions taken in response to the Air Cargo threat on 29 Oct 10 in an effort to account for all potential packages destined for the USA from Yemen since 15 Oct 10 and prevent future packages from coming into the USA from Yemen. (e.g., any analysis, documents, and actions taken by your organization in response to the Air Cargo Threat on 29 Oct 10.) *NOTE: The NICC was unable to contact US-VISIT or Risk Management for input to this RFI.*

IP

- Protective Security Advisors conducted outreach with multiple Jewish communities.
- Conducted outreach with Sector Coordinating Council members in the Postal & Shipping sector to determine and fulfill information requirements.
- Coordinated with offices within DHS intelligence and risk identification community to ensure coordination across DHS HQ elements producing awareness products and briefings.
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- IP is conducting outreach this week to select Jewish facilities and synagogues in Chicago

- Wednesday 03 November IP in cooperation with I&A, the FBI, local law enforcement, the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago and the Secure Communities Network (SCN) will be holding a FOUO conference call with major Jewish facilities and synagogues nationwide to provide recommended protective measures

Cont'

- New Orleans Protective Security Advisor (PSA) organized a teleconference with the New Orleans Police Department regarding the upcoming Jewish Federation of North America's General Assembly (Nov 7-9) and the International Lion of Judah Conference (Nov 8-10).
- New Orleans PSA is coordinating with USSS, local law enforcement and the regional fusion center, and conducting outreach to Security Directors of venue sites to provide IP tools and resources in an effort to reduce vulnerability in preparation for Vice President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu's visit
- DHS OBP continuing collaboration with FBI Counterterrorism Watch and OBP FBI Liaison Officer on technical aspects of SNAPSHOT product
- DHS OBP developed a follow-on TRIPwire Significant Incident Report (SIR). SIR held due to the current situation with UK/KSA/UAE
- All PSAs are available to distribute outreach material, including CV, PI, PM Reports for Religious Facilities and Postal Mail Package Handling; US Postal Inspection Service Guide to Mail Center Security; a suspicious package poster, and Chicago Threat Analysis Tearline to stakeholders in the community of concern.

NCC/NCS: No inputs at this time

US CERT: No inputs at this time

FPS: No action anticipated

RMA: No inputs at this time

V/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

NICC Watch Operations

Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

For more information on the NICC go to:
[DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center](#)

00263

NICC SWO

NOC SWO Restricted

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 4:22 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

NOC received an update report from TSOC:

- At 0355 EDT, the UPS package in Midlands, UK has been cleared by Scotland Yard.
 - The contents of the container included a laptop, various clothing articles, and porcelain.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, November 02, 2010 9:25 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - 01 Nov 10 (Update #2)

NOC,

Please include the response below in **red**:

The NICC is providing the following response to your request from DHS components and actions taken in response to the Air Cargo threat on 29 Oct 10 in an effort to account for all potential packages destined for the USA from Yemen since 15 Oct 10 and prevent future packages from coming into the USA from Yemen. (e.g., any analysis, documents, and actions taken by your organization in response to the Air Cargo Threat on 29 Oct 10.) *NOTE: The NICC was unable to contact US-VISIT or Risk Management for input to this RFI.*

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V/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

NICC Watch Operations

Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

For more information on the NICC go to:

[DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center](#)

Distro List

NICC SWO

NICC Spt

NOC IPNICC

NOC IP

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 4:23 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Chavez, Richard; DiFalco, Frank; Triner, Donald; Gramlick, Carl; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

NOC received an update report from TSA:

- At 0355 EDT, the UPS package in Midlands, UK has been cleared by Scotland Yard.
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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Duty Director

National Operations Center

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Unclas: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, November 02, 2010 9:29 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - 01 Nov 10 (Update #2)

NICC,

Thanks for the update; however, this RFI has been closed and no further updates are required.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Assistant Senior Watch Officer
 DHS, National Operations Center

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, November 02, 2010 9:25 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
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V/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

NICC Watch Operations

Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

For more information on the NICC go to:
[DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center](#)

00270

NICC Spt
NOC IPNICC
NOC IP

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:07 AM
To: Chavez, Richard
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); DiFalco, Frank
Subject: Senior Leadership Calls for Cargo Aircraft Incident

Sir,

Below is a timeline for the multiple issues we had during the Senior Leadership Calls for the Disguised International Explosive Shipment Incident (10/29/10):

- **2258 EDT:** S-2 called for Mr Leiter, NCTC Director. CWO attempted contact, but was unable to reach Mr Leiter (Only Cell Phone was available for after hours contact). S-2 asked to be connected to WHSR for assistance in contacting Mr Leiter. WHSR was able to contact Mr Leiter and establish a conference call between Mr Leiter and S-2.
- **2257 EDT :** Mr deVallence requested a conference call with S-2, Mr Kroloff, Mr Heyman, Mr Beers, Mr Cohen and himself.
 - SWO requested CWO to send ENS and e-mail notifying participants and providing conference information.
 - At same time:
 - Mr Brennan called for S-1
 - S-2 called for Mr Lieter
 - Mr deVallence called back on status of conference call
 - NCTC called for information on event
 - Mr Kroloff called requesting status of conference call
 - S-2 called requesting status of conference call
 - CWO 2 Executive Tracker developed multiple error messages forcing both CWOs to use one computer to obtain contact numbers.
 - **2315 EDT:** Decide to forego ENS and E-mail and contact participants directly using Secretary's Conference Bridge #1
 - After connecting three individuals a loud noise started coming over the line
 - This caused individuals to drop off the line and call back into be reconnect to the conference at the same time calls were being made to bring in the remaining individuals.
 - Due to the noise issue, switched conference to Bridge #2 and was able to successfully conference in all individuals, plus additional individuals requested by Mr Kroloff
 - During this period, Capt Sibley called in to be added to the conference, but was accidentally dropped due to all other conferees calling in to be re-connected to conference. At the time, both CWOs, IMOs, the ASWO, Tracker and SWO were answering phones due to volume of calls coming in simultaneously.
- **2336 EDT:** At conclusion of Conference call, U/S Wagner requested to reconvene conference call.
 - Due to issues with Bridge #1 on the 1st conference call, SWO directed use of Bridge #2
 - As with previous conference call, loud noise was heard after connecting approximately three participations.
 - Switched back to Bridge #1 and completed conference call

00272

- **0200 EDT:** Follow-on conference call completed on Bridge #1 without issues

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

DHS National Operations Center

Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, November 02, 2010 9:31 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: FW: NOC RFI 1230-10-010 - Summary of DHS Component Operational Activities - Air Cargo Threat - 01 Nov 10 (Update #2)

Tom,

Just in case you still have a need for this info, here is another NICC update in regard to 1230-10-010.

The NOC Watch closed this RFI yesterday and informed NICC today that the RFI is closed and no further updates are required.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Assistant Senior Watch Officer
DHS, National Operations Center

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V/r

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer

NICC Watch Operations

Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

For more information on the NICC go to:

DHS National Infrastructure Coordinating Center

00275

Distro List
NICC SWO
NICC Spt
NOC IPNICC
NOC IP

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: Triner, Donald
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:16 AM
To: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**
Subject: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)** NOC-Director
 RE: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

Is this correct summary....

Bottom line: all identified packages cleared. Sanaa, Yemen package shipments on 48 hour hold (UPS and FEDEX?).

Don

Don Triner
 Acting Director, Operations Coordination Division
 Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
 Department of Homeland Security
 Desk **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**

From: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 4:21 AM
To: NOC-DHS-SignificantIncident-Closehold
Cc: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**
Subject: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

NOC received an update report from TSOC:

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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
 Senior Watch Officer
 DHS National Operations Center
 Non-Secure: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:23 AM
To: Triner, Donald
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

That summary is correct, except we do not have the level of detail to confirm that the 48 hour hold is limited to FedEx and UPS only. TSA is researching.

R/

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Asst Senior Watch Officer
National Operations Center
Dept. of Homeland Security
Comm: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
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Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
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Senior Watch Officer

DHS National Operations Center

Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: Triner, Donald
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:28 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

Thank you - Yes please follow-up on what the "48 hour package hold" meant and is being enacted – thanks.

Don

Don Triner
Acting Director, Operations Coordination Division
Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
Department of Homeland Security
Desk - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:23 AM
To: Triner, Donald
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

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R/
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Asst Senior Watch Officer
National Operations Center
Dept. of Homeland Security
Comm (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

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Acting Director, Operations Coordination Division
Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
Department of Homeland Security
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Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
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(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:33 AM
To: Triner, Donald
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

TSA reports that a possible 48 hour hold will be placed on processing FedEx packages in Sanaa, Yemen; there is no mention of UPS.

Will advise if more information is developed.

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Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
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Desk - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

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Senior Watch Officer

DHS National Operations Center

Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: Triner, Donald
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:55 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

Thank you
Don Triner

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
DHS/OPS

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: Triner, Donald
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Fri Oct 29 05:33:01 2010
Subject: RE: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

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Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

That summary is correct, except we do not have the level of detail to confirm that the 48 hour hold is limited to FedEx and UPS only. TSA is researching.

R/

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Asst Senior Watch Officer
National Operations Center
Dept. of Homeland Security
Comm: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
[REDACTED]

From: Triner, Donald
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:16 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

Is this correct summary....

Bottom line: all identified packages cleared. Sanaa, Yemen package shipments on 48 hour hold (UPS and FEDEX?).

Don

Don Triner
Acting Director, Operations Coordination Division
Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
Department of Homeland Security
Desk - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)




From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 4:21 AM
To: NOC-DHS-Significant Incident-Closehold
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

NOC received an update report from TSOC:

- At 0355 EDT, the UPS package in Midlands, UK has been cleared by Scotland Yard.
 - The contents of the container included a laptop, various clothing articles, and porcelain.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: Triner, Donald
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:55 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: Re: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

Thank you
Don Triner

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
DHS/OPS

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: Triner, Donald
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Fri Oct 29 05:33:01 2010
Subject: RE: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

TSA reports that a possible 48 hour hold will be placed on processing FedEx packages in Sanaa, Yemen; there is no mention of UPS.

Will advise if more information is developed.

R/

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:23 AM
To: Triner, Donald
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: RE: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

That summary is correct, except we do not have the level of detail to confirm that the 48 hour hold is limited to FedEx and UPS only. TSA is researching.

R/

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Asst Senior Watch Officer
National Operations Center
Dept. of Homeland Security
Comm: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: Triner, Donald
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:16 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

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Don

Don Triner
Acting Director, Operations Coordination Division
Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
Department of Homeland Security
Desk - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)




From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 4:21 AM
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Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT - CLOSEHOLD - NOC #1230-10 Disguised International Explosive Shipment - UPDATE 3

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

NOC received an update report from TSOC:

- At 0355 EDT, the UPS package in Midlands, UK has been cleared by Scotland Yard.
 - The contents of the container included a laptop, various clothing articles, and porcelain.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Watch Officer
DHS National Operations Center
Non-Secure: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: CTWatch (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 5:57 AM
To: FBI CT Watch; Robert S. Mueller; CTW_TIER1; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

****FINAL UPDATE****

Per ITOS II, all targeted packages have been screened and cleared for explosive or dangerous materials. CT Watch has coordinated with ITOS II and CT Watch will not be providing any additional updates.

CT Watch
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: CTWatch
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 12:28 AM
To: CTWatch; Robert S. Mueller; CTW_TIER1; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: RE: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

*****UPDATE*****

Both packages (UPS and FedEx) have been located and are still currently being screened.

CT Watch
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: CTWatch
Sent: Thursday, October 28, 2010 11:22 PM
To: CTWatch; Robert S. Mueller; CTW_TIER1; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

*****UPDATE*****

Originating information is from a highly credible source.

FedEx has coordinated with Dubai Authorities re getting item off of FedEx aircraft and isolating item that contains TR (b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E) until Dubai can neutralize item.

As per SSA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) : UPS has located their package in Great Britain and putting in isolation. Authorities on scene.

Additional Flight information: UPS flight from Yemen to Cologne to Great Britain to Chicago.

CT Watch is currently engaged in efforts to obtain additional information regarding this matter. We will continue to post updates, when appropriate, in an expeditious manner.

CT Watch/rcs

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: CTWatch

Sent: Thursday, October 28, 2010 10:17 PM

To: Robert S. Mueller; CTW_TIER1; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Subject: TIER 1 NOTIFICATION: DISGUISED EXPLOSIVES SHIPPED VIA UPS AND FEDEX FROM YEMEN

ALCON:

Information received from a source which is assessed to be credible stated that there are explosives contained in toner cartridges which are to be detonated while in the air.

Reports are that the packages were sent from Yemen with a final destination of Chicago.

The following shipping numbers were provided:

(b) (7)(A), (b) (7)(E)

CT Watch has requested the relevant Divisions coordinate with the companies.

CT Watch is currently engaged in efforts to obtain additional information regarding this matter. We will continue to post updates, when appropriate, in an expeditious manner.

CT Watch/rcs

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 6:28 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: NOC.CBP
Subject: Possible Security Threat on Inbound FedEx and UPS Flights from Yemen

Per TSOC,

At 0220 hours on October 29, TSOC reported that DUBAI FedEx container was cleared by UAE EOD by K-9 and physical search. The container contained an HP Printer, misc. clothing articles, paper and CD's.

At 0355 hours on October 29, TSOC reported that Midland UPS container was cleared by Scotland Yard EOD. The container contained a laptop, clothing, and porcelain.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

TSA NOC Liaison Officer
NOC/OLE/FAMS Operations

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: Kroloff, Noah
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 7:18 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: 'Amy.Shlossman' (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 'brian.devallance' (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Noc-- can you please send a call-in for the 9a call to the group from last night

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: Triner, Donald
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 7:24 AM
To: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**; Chavez, Richard
Subject: FW: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights ~~(U//FOUO)~~

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Did we get this report from N-NC?

From: NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Director - OMB **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**
To: Winnefeld, James A Jr ADM USA NORAD USNORTHCOM HQs CC

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

USSOUTHCOM/SCJ3 (L); PFACC Watch (L); Washington Office - OMB (Pentagon); NORAD USNORTHCOM
 CMD CTR - Chaplain - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - DOE-OST - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR
 - J1 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - JAG - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - JSG Rep - OMB;
 NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Public Affairs - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - RFI Manager -
 OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Surgeon - OMB; N-NC JIOC Forward - OMB; NORAD CAT FIDO - OMB;
 NORAD J330 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Aerospace - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - AIR
 DOMAIN - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - COP Manager - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR -
 Current Intel - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Cyber Domain - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR
 - Director - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - IEB - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR -

Interagency - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Land - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Land
Domain Chief
- OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Maritime - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - METOC - OMB;
NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - MSD - CHIEF - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - MSD - OMB; NORAD
USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - NCO - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - NG - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR
- NMAC Tech - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - TXB
Sent: Thu Oct 28 23:38:39 2010
Subject: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S.
via Cargo Flights ~~(U//FOUO)~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights: On 29 Oct 10 at 0300Z (28 Oct 10 at 2100 MDT), the FBI CT Watch advised the N2C2 that they received what they judged to be credible information that a Yemeni citizen based at the Yemen American Institute for Languages-Computer-Management (Y.A.I.) in Sana'a Yemen, placed explosives inside printer cartridges, placed the cartridges inside printers, and wired one (sent via FEDEX) with a cell phone detonator and one (sent via UPS) with a timed detonator. The report stated these packages were shipped from Sana'a Yemen via FEDEX and UPS with the intended destination of two identified US churches in Chicago, IL. Saudi intelligence sources passed specific package numbers for the suspected items. Based on those numbers, a FEDEX flight carrying one of the identified packages is currently being held at Dubai International Airport and the UPS flight carrying the other package is currently be held in the United Kingdom (airport unspecified). The FBI reports both packages have been located and EOD teams are inspecting them. There is no indication of any additional explosives or associated aircraft involved with the incident. The N2C2 is coordinating with the NC/J-34, FAA, FBI, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM, DHS, TSA and JITF-CT regarding this incident. N2C2 continues to monitor.

1	100%
2	100%
3	100%

Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3817

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 7:27 AM
To: Kroloff, Noah; (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: 'Amy.Shlossman@ (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)'; brian.devallance (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) NOC-Director
Subject: 9 AM Call

Sir

Roger will do. Working the issue now.

My understanding was that Donna Bucella was not in the initial email from last night and adding her now.

We will push the email notification at 0830 and again at 0840.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Watch Officer
DHS
National Operations Center
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 7:33 AM
To: Triner, Donald
Cc: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Subject: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights (U//FOUO)

Sir

This report appears to be a summary from NORAD/NORTHCOM and came into the SWO box at 0713.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
DHS
National Operations Center
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: Triner, Donald
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 7:24 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); Chavez, Richard
Subject: FW: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights ~~(U//FOUO)~~

Did we get this report from N-NC?

From: NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Director - OMB (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
To: Winnefeld, James A Jr ADM USA NORAD USNORTHCOM HQs CC

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

USSOUTHCOM/SCJ3 (L); PFACC Watch (L); Washington Office - OMB (Pentagon); NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Chaplain - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - DOE-OST - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - J1 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - JAG - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - JSG Rep - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Public Affairs - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - RFI Manager - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Surgeon - OMB; N-NC JIOC Forward - OMB; NORAD CAT FIDO - OMB; NORAD J330 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Aerospace - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - AIR DOMAIN - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - COP Manager - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Current Intel - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Cyber Domain - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Director - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - IEB - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Interagency - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Land - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Land Domain Chief - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Maritime - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - METOC - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - MSD - CHIEF - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - MSD - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - NCO - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - NG - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - NMAC Tech - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - TXB
 Sent: Thu Oct 28 23:38:39 2010
 Subject: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights ~~(U//FOUO)~~

Classification: ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights: On 29 Oct 10 at 0300Z (28 Oct 10 at 2100 MDT), the FBI CT Watch advised the N2C2 that they received what they judged to be credible information that a Yemeni citizen based at the Yemen American Institute for Languages-Computer-Management (Y.A.I.) in Sana'a Yemen, placed explosives inside printer cartridges, placed the cartridges inside printers, and wired one (sent via FEDEX) with a cell phone detonator and one (sent via UPS) with a timed detonator. The report stated these packages were shipped from Sana'a Yemen via FEDEX and UPS with the intended destination of two unidentified US churches in Chicago, IL. Saudi intelligence sources passed specific package numbers for the suspected items. Based on those numbers, a FEDEX flight carrying one of the identified packages is currently being held at Dubai International Airport and the UPS flight carrying the other package is currently be held in the United Kingdom (airport unspecified). The FBI reports both packages have been located and EOD teams are inspecting them. There is no indication of any additional explosives or associated aircraft involved with the incident. The N2C2 is coordinating with the NC/J-34, FAA, FBI, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM, DHS, TSA and JITF-CT regarding this incident. N2C2 continues to monitor.

Very Respectfully,

CAPT ~~(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)~~, USN

NORAD & USNORTHCOM

Deputy Command Center Director

W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

250 Vandenberg St.

Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3817

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 9:54 AM
To: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**
Cc: Gramlick, Carl
Subject: FW: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights ~~(U//FOUO)~~

Fred,

Was this answered? If so, what was answer?

Thanks,
 mark

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Deputy Director
 National Operations Center
 Operations Coordination and Planning
 Department of Homeland Security

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: Triner, Donald
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 7:24 AM
To: **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**
Subject: FW: (U//FOUO) SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights (U//FOUO)

Did we get this report from N-NC?

From: NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Director - OMB **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)** >
To: Winnefeld, James A Jr ADM USA NORAD USNORTHCOM HQs CC
Cc: Abel, Daniel B RDML USA USNORTHCOM HQs J3; AFNORTH A7S OMB; Aguirre, Peter A Maj USA NORAD HQs CS; Armstrong, Steven E CIV USA NORAD HQs J33; Bisacre, Brian R LTC USNORTHCOM HQs CS; Chorney, David L CIV USA USNORTHCOM HQs J3; Crump, Donna A CIV USA NORAD USNORTHCOM HQs CS; Dean, Garry C MajGen USAF ACC AFNORTH/CC; Duval, Marcel J LGen CAN NORAD USNORTHCOM HQs ND; FAA HQ OPS Center <9-awa-ash-woc@faa.gov>; Fox, Timothy R CAPT NORAD USNORTHCOM HQs RF; Herring, Johnny G CTR USA USNORTHCOM HQs J34; Hill, Jeffery A CIV USA USNORTHCOM HQs J34; Izzi, Brick Col NORAD HQs NJ33; Joseph, James R BG USNORTHCOM HQs J5
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); JS DDO and ADDO <j3ddo_addolist@js.pentagon.mil>; Long, Scott C Col USAF ALCOM JTF-AK/J3 **(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)**; Mathis, Jeff W BG JCS J3/NMCC; McClintock, Bruce H Col NORAD USNORTHCOM HQs CC; Munster, Conrad H COL NORAD USNORTHCOM HQs J3; NGB A3 (RELCAN) <n gb.a3xc@afnorth.tbmc.s.relc an>; NGB Command Center
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C); NORAD J3 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - CCD DCCD - DL; NORAD

USNORTHCOM CP - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CX - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM DEPUTY LIST; NORAD USNORTHCOM DIRECTORS - DL; NORAD USNORTHCOM EXEC LIST - DL; NORAD USNORTHCOM HC - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM HO - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM IC - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM IG - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM J1 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM J2 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM J23 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM J4 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM J5 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM J6 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM J63 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM J7 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM J73 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM J8 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM JA - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM NG OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM PA - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM POLAD - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM RF - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM Senior Enlisted Leadership - DL; NORAD USNORTHCOM SG - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM SJS - OMB; Sanchez, Merri J Dr Civ USAF AFSPC AFSPC NASA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); Schofield, Scott B BrigGen USNORTHCOM HQs NG; Thomas, Linda A COL USNORTHCOM HQs RF; Todorov, Kenneth E Brig Gen USAF USNORTHCOM HQs SJFHQ; Treacy, Jonathan T BG JCS J3 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); USNORTHCOM J3 - OMB; USNORTHCOM J3 DIV CHIEFS - DL; USNORTHCOM LNO - DL; Tagg, Scott LtCol USAF ACC AFNORTH/AFNSEP; USNORTHCOM LNO to ALCOM/JTF-AK (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); USNORTHCOM LNO to CanadaCom (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); USNORTHCOM LNO to CanadaCom (b) (6), (b) (7)(C); USNORTHCOM LNO to NC - DL; USNORTHCOM LNO to NCTC <SCOTTET@nctc.gov>; Tull, Mark M Col USMC USSOUTHCOM/SCJ3 (L); PFACC Watch (L); Washington Office - OMB (Pentagon); NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Chaplain - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - DOE-OST - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - J1 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - JAG - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - JSG Rep - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Public Affairs - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - RFI Manager - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Surgeon - OMB; N-NC JIOC Forward - OMB; NORAD CAT FIDO - OMB; NORAD J330 - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Aerospace - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - AIR DOMAIN - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - COP Manager - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Current Intel - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Cyber Domain - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Director - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - IEB - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Interagency - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Land - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Land Domain Chief - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - Maritime - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - METOC - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - MSD - CHIEF - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - MSD - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - NCO - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - NG - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - NMAC Tech - OMB; NORAD USNORTHCOM CMD CTR - TXB

Sent: Thu Oct 28 23:38:39 2010
 Subject: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights ~~(U//FOUO)~~

Classification: ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights: On 29 Oct 10 at 0300Z (28 Oct 10 at 2100 MDT), the FBI CT Watch advised the N2C2 that they received what they judged to be credible information that a Yemeni citizen based at the Yemen American Institute for Languages-Computer-Management (Y.A.I.) in Sana'a Yemen, placed explosives inside printer cartridges, placed the cartridges inside printers, and wired one (sent via FEDEX) with a cell phone detonator and one (sent via UPS) with a timed detonator. The report stated these packages were shipped from Sana'a Yemen via FEDEX and UPS with the intended destination of two unidentified US churches in Chicago, IL. Saudi intelligence sources passed specific package numbers for the suspected items. Based on those numbers, a FEDEX flight carrying one of the identified packages is currently being held at Dubai International Airport and the UPS flight carrying the other package is currently be held in the United Kingdom (airport unspecified). The FBI reports both packages have been located and EOD teams are inspecting them. There is no indication of any additional explosives or associated aircraft involved with the incident. The N2C2 is coordinating with the NC/J-34, FAA, FBI, USEUCOM, USCENCOM, USTRANSCOM, DHS, TSA and JITF-CT regarding this incident. N2C2 continues to monitor.

Very Respectfully,

CAPT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), USN

NORAD & USNORTHCOM

Deputy Command Center Director

W: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

250 Vandenberg St.

Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3817

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 9:58 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Gramlick, Carl
Subject: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights ~~(U//FOUO)~~

Mark

Yes it was. I emailed Mr Triner that this report was a summary of the incident from NORAD/NORTHCOM sent to the SWO box. He appeared to be fine with that because I have not heard from him.

Thanks

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Senior Watch Officer
DHS
National Operations Center
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 9:54 AM
To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Cc: Gramlick, Carl
Subject: FW: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights ~~(U//FOUO)~~

Fred,

Was this answered? If so, what was answer?

Thanks,
mark

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Deputy Director
National Operations Center
Operations Coordination and Planning
Department of Homeland Security
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: Triner, Donald
Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 7:24 AM

00301

To: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Chavez, Richard

Subject: FW: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights ~~(U//FOUO)~~

Did we get this report from N-NC?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Sent: Thu Oct 28 23:38:39 2010

Subject: ~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights (U//FOUO)

Classification: ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~(U//FOUO)~~ SPOTREP: Yemeni Citizen May Have Attempted to Send Explosives to the U.S. via Cargo Flights: On 29 Oct 10 at 0300Z (28 Oct 10 at 2100 MDT), the FBI CT Watch advised the N2C2 that they received what they judged to be credible information that a Yemeni citizen based at the Yemen American Institute for Languages-Computer-Management (Y.A.I.) in Sana'a Yemen, placed explosives inside printer cartridges, placed the cartridges inside printers, and wired one (sent via FEDEX) with a cell phone detonator and one (sent via UPS) with a timed detonator. The report stated these packages were shipped from Sana'a Yemen via FEDEX and UPS with the intended destination of two identified US churches in Chicago, IL. Saudi intelligence sources passed specific package numbers for the suspected items. Based on those numbers, a FEDEX flight carrying one of the identified packages is currently being held at Dubai International Airport and the UPS flight carrying the other package is currently be held in the United Kingdom (airport unspecified). The FBI reports both packages have been located and EOD teams are inspecting them. There is no indication of any additional explosives or associated aircraft involved with the incident. The N2C2 is coordinating with the NC/J-34, FAA, FBI, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USTRANSCOM, DHS, TSA and JITF-CT regarding this incident. N2C2 continues to monitor.

Very Respectfully,

CAPT ~~(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)~~, USN

NORAD & USNORTHCOM

Deputy Command Center Director

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